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THE (SURPRISING) TRUTH ABOUT 
SCHIAVO: A DEFEAT FOR THE CAUSE OF 
AUTONOMY 
0. Carter Snead* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A survey of the commentary following the conclusion of the 
Theresa Marie Schiavo matter leaves one with the impression 
that the case was a victory for the cause of autonomy and the 
right of self-determination in the end-of-life context. According 
to the prevailing account, the case involved a husband (Michael 
Schiavo) fighting for his right as a spouse to vindicate his pro-
foundly disabled wife's wish to decline artificial nutrition and 
hydration. To do so, Mr. Schiavo had to overcome the efforts of 
his wife's parents (the Schindlers), and their religious conserva-
tive supporters (including politicians both in Florida and Wash-
ington), who fought to keep Ms. Schiavo alive at all costs. This 
battle of autonomy versus the sanctity of all human life (howso-
ever diminished) raged throughout literally every branch of gov-
ernment, as well as in the national and international media. In 
the end, though, it was the judicial branch that settled the mat-
ter, finding that Michael Schiavo had the right to implement his 
wife's wishes, free from any governmental intervention or ob-
struction. It was a decisive victory for autonomy and privacy, and 
demonstrated that an individual's desire to be free from un-
wanted life-sustaining measures can be honored, even after she 
is silenced by severe cognitive impairment. 
The foregoing narrative is compelling, easy to understand, 
and fits perfectly within the overarching paradigm typically used 
to interpret the cultural, legal, and political conflicts of present 
• Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School; former General Counsel, The 
President's Council on Bioethics. Thanks to the editors of CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMENTARY for soliciting this essay. Special thanks to John A. Ritsick, Brian T. 
McGuire and Leigh Fitzpatrick Snead for their comments and support. Erin Galloway 
provided invaluable research assistance. 
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day America. The only problem with this widely shared under-
standing of the Schiavo case is that it is wrong in almost every 
key respect. The above account misstates the formal question in 
dispute, the principal focus of the Florida courts' inquiry, the 
substance of the courts' various holdings, the basis for the courts' 
decisions, and the character of the participants in the larger pub-
lic debate. In this essay, I will seek to correct these errors and 
demonstrate that, contrary to popular understanding, it is the de-
fenders of autonomy and self-determination who should be most 
troubled by what transpired in the Schiavo matter. Far from be-
ing a victory for the cause of freedom, it is instead a cautionary 
tale of what can happen when the legal preconditions for exercis-
ing autonomy are absent or ignored. 
II. WHAT ACfUALLY HAPPENED 
It is useful to begin by noting briefly some of the more ob-
vious factual flaws in the prevailing narrative. Contrary to the 
popular account, the Schiavo matter was not a dispute about 
which principle-respect for autonomy or the sanctity of all hu-
man life-should govern decision-making regarding the admini-
stration of life-sustaining measures. Nor was it a case about 
who-as between spouses and parents-is best situated to make 
such decisions for incapacitated loved ones. It also was not a case 
about who-as between the government and the private individ-
ual- should have the final say in this intimate and private do-
main. 
To the contrary, both the Schindlers and Mr. Schiavo 
agreed from the outset that the relevant good to be defended 
was Ms. Schiavo's right to autonomy and self-determination. De-
spite the acrimony and discord between Mr. Schiavo and the 
Schindlers, they were in complete agreement that the proper 
task at hand was to discern and implement (if possible) Ms. 
Schiavo's wishes regarding artificial nutrition and hydration. 
Thus, the Schiavo case did not involve a philosophical quarrel 
about what is owed to the profoundly disabled- all parties to the 
conflict agreed that self-determination was the paramount value. 
Rather, the case was essentially a factual dispute about the con-
tent of Ms. Schiavo's intentions. Mr. Schiavo argued that she 
would not want to continue living under the circumstances, and 
the Schindlers asserted the contrary1 (or alternatively, that her 
1. See generally Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178-79 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 
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wishes had not been sufficiently established to support termina-
tion of artificial nutrition and hydration).2 Accordingly, the out-
come of the case cannot properly be interpreted as a victory for 
the princiQle of autonomy over the sanctity of life, as some have 
suggested.3 This deeper (and more interesting) dilemma was 
never the focus of the litigants' or the court's inquiry. 
The courts in this case likewise were not called upon to de-
termine which party-Mr. Schiavo or the Schindlers-was best 
suited to act on behalf of Ms. Schiavo. Rather, the court took it 
upon itself to determine the proper course of treatment for Ms. 
Schiavo, based on its own assessment of the facts and law.• The 
Florida court's holding did not, therefore, authorize Mr. Schiavo 
to make the final decision for Ms. Schiavo because he was her 
husband. The court implemented its own determination regard-
ing this question. And it did so in a compulsory way-the care-
takers of Ms. Schiavo were required, on pain of contempt of 
court, to follow the court's order to withdraw artificial nutrition 
and hydration.5 Thus, the Schiavo matter cannot properly be un-
derstood as a victory for spouses over parents in end-of-life deci-
sion-making, as some commentators have suggested.6 Similarly, 
it should not be celebrated as a case in which the individual was 
empowered to make her decision free from any governmental 
intervention. It was, in fact, the government (namely, the Florida 
judicial branch) that decided by its own lights what was owed to 
Ms. Schiavo. 
Though ancillary to the focus of this essay, a brief word 
about the larger political debate is in order. The conventional 
2001). 
2. The Schindlers also raised the additional arguments that Ms. Schiavo was not in 
a persistent vegetative state and that she could recover some of her lost faculties if she 
were provided with the proper course of therapy. For reasons discussed below, however, 
these arguments were ancillary to the central question before the court, namely, the con· 
tent of Ms. Schiavo's actual intentions. 
3. See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Schiavo Case: The Legacy; A Collision 
of Disparate Forces May be Reshaping American LAw, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 1, 2005, at A18 
(describing the case as a conflict between those ethicists supporting "autonomy and self 
determination" and "social conservatives who argue that sanctity of life trumps quality of 
life"). 
4. See Schindler, 780 So. 2d at 178, 179 (noting that Mr. Schiavo "invoked the trial 
court's jurisdiction to allow the trial coun to serve as [Ms. Schiavo's] surrogate decision-
maker" and observing that in this case, "the trial coun essentially serves as [Ms. 
Schiavo's] guardian") (emphasis added). 
5. See Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 559 n.5 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001). 
6. See generally Arthur Caplan, The Time Has Come to Let Terri Schiavo Die, 
MSNBC.COM, Mar. 18, 2005, http://msnbc.rnsn.com/idf7231440/ (strongly suggesting that 
the question before the court was whether or not Michael Schiavo should be allowed to 
make the decision for Ms. Schiavo, given that he is her husband). 
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wisdom seems to be that this case was merely another skirmish 
in the now all too familiar conflict between religious conserva-
tives and secular liberals (and their occasional libertarian allies).7 
But this view fails to capture the complexity and peculiarity of 
the political dimension of the Schiavo matter. The political de-
bate did not feature the usual alignment of politicians and activ-
ists who regularly weigh in on contested social issues. Liberal 
champions such as Senator Tom Harkin, Reverend Jesse Jack-
son, and Ralph Nader rose to the defense of the Schindler fam-
ily. Nearly half of the voting members of the Congressional 
Black Caucus supported federal legislation to authorize the 
Middle District of Florida to hear, de novo, any federal claims 
asserted on behalf of Ms. Schiavo by the Schindlers.8 Indeed, not 
a single U.S. Senator voted against this extraordinary avenue of 
relief. To be sure, many liberals and conservatives intervened in 
a manner that one might expect-the former for Mr. Schiavo 
and the latter for the Schindlers. But these partisans made ar-
guments that seemed to be in deep tension with their overarch-
ing philosophies and ideological commitments. Conservatives 
supporting the Schindlers abandoned both their longstanding 
deference to the states and their usual opposition to additional 
layers of federal procedural safeguards for civil rights (manifest 
in their public arguments regarding the availability of habeas 
corpus relief, particularly in the death penalty context). Con-
versely, liberals supporting Mr. Schiavo acted uncharacteristi-
cally by arguing for strict deference to the findings of the Florida 
courts, and against additional federal process aimed at preserv-
ing the individual rights and liberties of the weakest and most 
vulnerable among us. In a departure from the norm, conserva-
tives made impassioned pleas for substantive justice, and liberals 
persistently argued for reliance on formal process. These inver-
sions and apparent contradictions in the political discourse were 
oddly reminiscent of another high-profile case arising from Flor-
ida, just five years earlier. 
7. See also Abby Goodenough, Victory in Florida Feeding Case Emboldens the 
Religious Right, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,2003, at A1; Editorial, Theresa Marie Schiavo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A22 (describing supporters of the Schindlers as those who "hold 
religious convictions so heartfelt that they could not bow to public opinion or the courts 
and accept the conclusion that Ms. Schiavo should be allowed to die"). See generally Edi-
torial, Exploiting Terri Schiavo; A Blow to the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at 
A22 (describing the supporters of the Schindlers as "members of the religious right"). 
8. See generally Erin Texeira, Schiavo Case Divides Black Leaders; Jackson Shows 
African Americans' Conservative Side, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 28. 
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III. SCHIAVO'S IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTONOMY 
Granting that the conventional understanding of the 
Schiavo matter is technically mistaken and should be modified as 
described above, why should it finally be regarded as a blow to 
the cause of autonomy and self-determination in this particular 
domain? To answer this question, it is necessary first to set forth 
(in cursory fashion) the underlying aim of the defenders of 
autonomy in this context. Then, it will be necessary to provide a 
brief sketch of how the law-both as enacted and interpreted-
might ideally serve to promote and defend the goods of auton-
omy and self-determination. I will then use this standard to as-
sess the process and outcome of the Schiavo case. I submit that 
judged according to this measure, it is clear that both the process 
and result in the Schiavo case undermine the ideal of autono-
mous decision-making at the end of life, and should thus be con-
demned by those who champion these values in the public 
square. 
Before proceeding with this analysis, it bears noting that I 
do not in this essay seek to resolve the rich and complex debate 
over which moral and ethical principles should be paramount 
when deciding how to act for a profoundly disabled loved one 
who requires artificial nutrition and hydration, but cannot speak 
for herself. By focusing exclusively on the principle of autonomy 
and self-determination, I do not intend to imply that it should 
have pride of place in such decisions, at the expense of other 
goods and values. Indeed, I do not even mean to suggest that the 
proper method for resolving ethical questions such as those pre-
sented by the Schiavo case is through applying or balancing ab-
stract principles as such. My narrow purpose in this essay is sim-
ply to demonstrate that the legal process utilized in the Schiavo 
matter utterly failed to advance the cause of autonomy in the 
end-of-life context. 
A. THE VISION OF AUTONOMY AT THE END OF LIFE 
The principle of respect for autonomy and self-
determination predominates in modem bioethics: "Because of 
the intimate and intrusive nature of biomedical decisions, a cen-
tral focus of bioethics has been to respect and protect an indi-
vidual's autonomy in making those decisions." 9 Advocates for a 
9. John A. Robertson, Precommitment Issues in Bioethics, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1849, 
1849 (2003). 
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robust notion of autonomy ground their claims in the "moral fact 
that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as 
a whole. "10 The concept of personal autonomy as a principal 
animating good is also well ensconced in the decisional law of 
the U.S. Supreme Court: "It is settled now, as it was when the 
Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution 
places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most 
basic decisions ... about bodily integrity."11 
The principle of informed consent- the cornerstone of 
modem biomedical ethics- is in large measure an extension of 
this general concept of personal autonomy. Under this venerable 
doctrine, no medical intervention may be undertaken without 
the intelligent and voluntary consent of the patient.12 Implicit in 
this principle is the freedom to decline medical interventions, re-
gardless of their character (life-sustaining or otherwise). 
The right to refuse medical treatment has come to be re-
garded as an essential mechanism for self governance at the end 
of life: "[T]he choice between life and death is a deeply personal 
decision .... [T]he Due Process Clause protects an interest in life 
as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treat-
ment."13 
Under this view, autonomy demands that individuals have 
the right to have their preferences regarding life-sustaining 
measures honored and implemented, free from governmental or 
private intervention. 
B. THE LAW'S ROLE IN PROMOTING AND DEFENDING 
AUTONOMY 
What sort of legal framework is best suited to advance this 
vision of autonomy at the end of life? First, there must be legis-
lation in place that makes the patient's subjective desires regard-
ing life-sustaining measures decisive, over and above any com-
peting claims raised by third parties or the state. The positive law 
must provide a reliable and transparent mechanism for discern-
ing and implementing the wishes of the patient. An equally im-
10. Thornburgh v. Am. Coli. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,777 
(1986) (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PuB. 
AFF. 288-89 (1977)). 
11. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,849 (1992). 
12 See generally Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving 
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 
228, 237 {1973). 
13. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-281 (1990). 
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portant feature of such legislation is the presence of robust safe-
guards against abuse-including especially the imposition of the 
preferences of some third party, the state, or even the court, un-
der the false pretense of implementing the patient's intentions. 
Such displacement of the patient's desires by those of others, or 
by some "reasonable person," "best interests," or "quality of 
life" standard, is singularly anathema to the ideal of autonomy. 
The risk of this sort of abuse is especially grave when the evi-
dence of the patient's intentions is scant or ambiguous. 
Sound positive law, standing alone, is insufficient to realize 
the vision of autonomy at the end of life. It is equally important 
that the laws described above be scrupulously applied by those 
charged with interpreting them. When undertaking to discern 
the intent of the patient, judges should be particularly mindful of 
the potential for abuse, as well as vigilant against the natural 
human tendency to put a thumb on the scales in service of one's 
own preferences or sympathies. 
C. ASSESSING SCHIAVO: THE LAW'S FAILURE 
Judged according to these standards, the process and out-
come in the Schiavo matter were woefully inadequate to ad-
vance the cause of autonomy and self-determination. The deci-
sional and positive law governing the Schiavo matter (and cases 
like it) is imperfect, but generally oriented towards the values of 
autonomy and self-determination at the end of life. However, 
the interpretation and application of these laws by the various 
courts hearing the Schiavo case profoundly undermined these 
purposes by ignoring the very features of the law essential to 
preserving autonomy in this context. 
1. THE DECISIONAL AND POSITIVE LAW GOVERNING 
SCHIAVO 
At the broadest level of abstraction, the overarching au-
thorities governing the Schiavo matter (and similar cases) are 
quite friendly to the vision of autonomy and self-determination 
described above. The Supreme Courts of the United States and 
Florida have both recognized a right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment.14 Moreover, a person does not lose this right due to 
14. Id. at 279 & n.7 (locating this interest in the "liberty clause" of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and explicitly rejecting the view that the right to refuse treatment is 
grounded in a generalized constitutional right of privacy); State v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 
10 (Fla. 1990) (grounding the interest in the "right of privacy" provided by the state con-
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cognitive incapacity; such patients are entitled to have their prior 
intentions honored and implemented.15 The Supreme Court of 
Florida has held that this right to refuse treatment applies to any 
form of intervention, life-sustaining or otherwise (including the 
administration of artificial nutrition and hldration to non-
terminally ill patients, such as Ms. Schiavo V In their compre-
hensive (and definitive) treatise on the law governing the end of 
life, Professors Alan Meisel and Kathy Cerminara note that 
there is an emerging consensus supporting this type of legal re-
gime.17 It is, without question, a framework that privileges per-
sonal autonomy and self-determination above other considera-
tions and values. 
Similarly, the positive law governing the Schiavo case is, in 
the main, structured to promote patient autonomy. Indeed, the 
relevant Florida statutes enacted to regulate end-of-life decision-
making18 adopt a purely subjective standard for those patients 
(like Ms. Schiavo) who lack an advance directive memorializing 
their intentions. For such cases, a third party may carry out the 
patient's wishes, provided that there is "clear and convincing 
evidence that the decision would have been the one the patient 
would have chosen had the patient been competent."19 The Flor-
ida statutory law closely tracks the purely subjective standard 
previously articulated by the Florida Supreme Court: "One does 
not exercise another's right of self-determination or fulfill that 
person's right of privacy by making a decision which the state, 
the family, or public opinion would prefer. The surrogate deci-
sion-maker must be confident that he or she can and is voicing 
the patient's decision."20 
Thus, the Florida statutory authority provides that the subjective 
intentions of the patient regarding end-of-life care are decisive, 
over and above any other party's preferences. Within the spec-
trum of end-of-life regulation, Florida's laws arguably offer the 
strongest protection possible for patient autonomy. 
stitution) (courts and commentators refer to this case as In re Guardianship of Brown-
ing). 
15. Herbert, 568 So. 2d at 12. 
16. I d. at 11, n.6. 
17. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY CERMINARA, THE RIGHI TO DIE§ 2.02, 2-5 (Aspen 
3d ed. 2005). 
18. See FLA. STAT.§ 765.101-.546 (2003). 
19. I d. § 765.401(3). If such a determination of the patient's actual intentions is im-
possible, the surrogate may act in the patient's "best interests." 
20. Herbert, 568 So. 2d at 13 (quoting In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 
258,269 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 1989)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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Florida law also includes robust safeguards intended to pre-
vent abuse and error, and to provide maximal assurance that the 
action taken is truly what the patient would have wanted under 
the circumstances. Its primary mechanism for these purposes is 
the standard of proof used to evaluate evidence of the patient's 
intentions. The patient's desire to decline life-sustaining meas-
ures must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence."21 Fur-
thermore, the law provides that in the face of any ambiguity, the 
court is to presume that the patient would have chosen to "de-
fend life in exercising his or her right of privacy."22 By adopting 
the highest evidentiary threshold available in civil cases, the 
Florida law aims to provide the utmost degree of certainty that 
the decision ultimately made truly reflects the wishes of the pa-
tient who has been silenced by her disability. It goes without say-
ing that an erroneous decision to terminate life-sustaining meas-
ures based on unreliable evidence of a patient's wishes is a grave 
violation of her right to autonomy and self-determination. A 
lower evidentiary standard would increase the risk of such error. 
Moreover, a lesser standard would make it far easier for third 
parties to succeed in imposing their own preferences at the ex-
pense of those of the patient. Similarly, a more permissive stan-
dard would allow the court to indulge its understandable, hu-
man, yet clearly impermissible impulse, to decide the case 
according to its own subjective assessment of the patient's qual-
ity of life. In short, the clear and convincing evidence standard-
a bulwark against possible abuse and a means of ensuring a reli-
able result-is an absolutely crucial element of the Florida law's 
effort to promote the actual exercise of autonomy by patients no 
longer capable of expressing their wishes. 
It is noteworthy that the Florida law allocates the risk of er-
ror to the party seeking to discontinue life-sustaining measures, 
presumably on the theory that an erroneous decision to termi-
nate such treatment is irremediable. By contrast, an erroneous 
decision to continue life-sustaining measures results in preserva-
tion of the status quo, allowing for the possibility in the future 
that new evidence of the patient's subjective preferences will 
come to light, such that her right to self determination can finally 
(and reliably) be vindicated. 
21. FLA. STAT. § 765.401{3). 
22. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 {Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001) (quotation 
omitted). 
392 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:383 
Florida law also aims to prevent error and abuse by provid-
ing for the appointment of a guardian to ensure that the wishes 
of the patient are being identified and implemented, particularly 
when proxy decision-makers are unavailable or unwilling to do 
so.
23 Moreover, the Florida law makes clear that the presiding 
judge may not serve simultaneously as arbiter of the case at hand 
and the guardian of the patient.24 In this way, the Florida law at-
tempts to prevent any party-including the court- from suc-
cumbing to the temptation of substituting its own judgment for 
that of the incapacitated patient. 
The final safeguard against abuse and error provided by the 
Florida law is the nature of the court's jurisdiction in such mat-
ters. The jurisdiction exercised in cases such as Schiavo's is that 
of a guardianship court; its orders to terminate life-sustaining 
measures are executory in nature, meaning that even after the 
decision is rendered, the court retains jurisdiction until the death 
of the ward: "[A]s long as the ward is alive, the order is subject to 
recall and is executory in nature. "25 In practice, this means that 
the court's decision is subject to change and revision based on 
alteration of the underlying facts or law.26 This is in stark contrast 
to a final judgment, which may not be disturbed after it is ren-
dered. The policy reason for designating judicial orders termi-
23. See generally FLA. STAT. § 744.404. Note, however, that the Florida courts re-
viewing the Schiavo matter did not make full use of this provision; there was only one 
guardian ad litem (appointed in 1998) who represented Ms. Schiavo's interests-attorney 
Richard Pearse. His term of service was quite brief, and his tenure was not renewed. In-
stead, the trial court chose to serve as Ms. Schiavo's guardian in this case, noting that an 
additional guardian ad litem would "tend to duplicate the function of the judge, would 
add little of value to this process, and might cause the process to be influenced by hear-
say or matters outside the record." Schindler, 780 So. 2d at 179. Dr. Jay Wolfson later 
served as guardian ad litem pursuant to legislation passed by the Florida state legislature 
in 2003. Dr. Wolfson's tenure was also quite brief, and the law authorizing his service was 
declared unconstitutional. 
24. See § 744.309(1)(b). Note, however, that this is precisely what the court did in 
the Schiavo case. See supra notes 4, 23. 
25. See Schiavo v. Schindler, 792 So. 2d 551, 559 (Fla. Dist. 0. App. 2001) (empha-
sis added). Note, however, that the Florida Supreme Court, without explanation or even 
a single citation to relevant legal authority, declared the order in Schiavo to be final 
rather than executory. Relying in significant part on this error, the Florida Supreme 
Court declared the interventions of the Florida Legislature and Governor Jeb Bush (via 
"Terri's Law") to be unconstitutional. See Bush v. Schiavo, No. SC04-925, 2004 WL 
2109983 (Fla. Sept. 23, 2004). For an extended discussion of executory judgments in the 
separation of powers context, and for a critique of the Florida Supreme Court's decision 
in this regard, see 0. Carter Snead, Dynamic Complementarity: Terri's Law and Separa-
tion of Powers Principles in the End of Ufe Context, 57 FLA. L. REv. 53 (2005). 
26. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000) ("Prospective relief under a 
continuing, executory decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underly-
ing law."). 
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nating life-sustaining measures as executory is clear-if subse-
quent changes in the law or facts compel the conclusion that the 
original judgment was erroneous, a mechanism to amend the re-
sult is still available. In this way, the Florida law creates another 
legal hedge against the possibility of a mistaken factual conclu-
sion regarding the patient's true wishes. 
Despite its strong orientation towards vindicating the 
autonomy and self-determination of incapacitated patients like 
Ms. Schiavo, the law in Florida is imperfect in one crucial re-
spect: It provides no clear means of resolving disputes between 
family members with competing views of the patient's subjective 
preferences regarding the administration of life-sustaining meas-
ures. The law does provide, as described above, for the appoint-
ment of a guardian to advise the court when no family member is 
willing or able to serve as a proxy decision-maker, but the law 
provides little more by way of guidance. 
2. THE ADJUDICATION OF SCHIAVO 
While Florida's positive and decisional law governing end-
of-life decision-making is imperfect, it is generally structured in 
such a way as to defend and promote autonomy. In stark con-
trast, the application and interpretation of these laws by the 
courts hearing the Schiavo case directly and persistently under-
mined these values in a manner that should be distressing to 
anyone who aspires to self governance at the end of life. Con-
trary to popular understanding, the courts charged by the Flor-
ida laws with discerning and implementing Ms. Schiavo's wishes 
paid scant attention to the centrally important question of her 
actual subjective intentions, and focused most of their time and 
energy on ancillary factual questions relating to the nature of her 
condition and the possible benefits of various therapies. Such 
questions are more appropriate to a "best interests" or "quality 
of life" approach, which are paternalistic in character and con-
trary to the values undergirding the principle of autonomy. To 
the extent that the courts did take steps to discern Ms. Schiavo's 
wishes, they did so in an unrigorous and unreliable manner, ig-
noring crucial procedural safeguards prescribed by the Florida 
guardianship laws. As a result, it is impossible to have any confi-
dence that the conclusions reached by the courts accorded with 
Ms. Schiavo's actual wishes. If the court's order to terminate ar-
tificial nutrition and hydration was indeed a fulfillment of Ms. 
Schiavo's subjective desires, this is a happy accident. It was 
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manifestly not the result of a judicial process calculated to ad-
vance autonomy and self-determination. 
Mr. Schiavo's legal efforts to discontinue artificial nutrition 
and hydration for his wife lasted seven years. However, 
throughout this entire period, there was only one evidentiary 
hearing (in 2000) devoted to the question of Ms. Schiavo's 
wishes regarding life-sustaining measures. By any measure, the 
evidence presented at this hearing was scant, vague, and contra-
dictory. Nevertheless, the court inexplicably concluded that Ms. 
Schiavo's desire to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration 
had been proven by "clear and convincing" evidence.27 By abro-
gating its responsibility to scrupulously and rigorously apply this 
evidentiary standard, the court untethered itself from the essen-
tial mechanism provided by the Florida law for ensuring a reli-
able determination of Ms. Schiavo's wishes. 
To fully appreciate the deeply flawed nature of this judicial 
determination, and to understand its implications for the ideal of 
autonomous decision-making at the end of life, it is necessary to 
consider briefly the jurisprudence of the "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard in this context. Even a cursory account of 
how courts have consistently applied this evidentiary standard in 
end-of-life disputes demonstrates the extraordinary degree to 
which the Florida courts in Schiavo departed from its proper ap-
plication. 
As mentioned above, the clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard is the highest available in civil cases. To satisfy this 
standard, evidence must be "so clear as to leave no substantial 
doubt" and be "sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating 
assent of every reasonable mind. "28 To further illustrate the 
quantum of evidence that is necessary to meet this threshold, 
consider the following: "The evidence must be of such weight 
that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or 
conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations 
sought to be established."29 One court put it even more strongly, 
27. See generally In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
February 11, 2000) [hereinafter Feb. 2000 Order] (granting authorization to Michael 
Schiavo to discontinue artificial life support for Theresa Marie Schiavo). 
28. Conservatorship of Wendland, 26 Cal. 4th 519,552 (2001) (quoting In re Angel 
P., 28 Cal. 3d 908,919 (1981)). 
29. Inquiry Concerning Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994). See also Matter of 
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (N.J. 1987) 
(Evidence is "clear and convincing" when it produce[s] in the mind of the trier 
of fact a finn belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be 
established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable 
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noting that the clear and convincing evidence standard requires 
the trier of fact to be "convinced as far as humanly possible" that 
the evidence presented truly represents the wishes of the now-
incapacitated patient.30 
What specific criteria should a trier of fact look to in evalu-
ating evidence of a patient's intent regarding end-of-life prefer-
ences? While Florida law is silent on the specific application of 
the "clear and convincing" standard in the end-of-life context, a 
significant number of other jurisdictions have developed a well-
settled, uniform, and consistent body of persuasive authority that 
provides surprisingly clear answers. In cases like Ms. Schiavo's, 
where the evidence presented consists entirely of past oral com-
munications to others, such statements must demonstrate a 
"firm, settled, ... serious, well thought out, consistent decision to 
refuse treatment under these exact circumstances or circum-
stances highly similar to the current situation. "31 The weight the 
trier of fact must accord to such oral communications depends 
on the "remoteness, consistency, specificity, and solemnity of 
[the] prior statements."32 Only reflective, deliberate, solemn, and 
consistent remarks expressing the desire to decline the type of 
life-sustaining treatment at issue are sufficient to meet the clear 
and convincing threshold. 
Similarly, courts have unambiguously described the types of 
prior statements that do not satisfy the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard in the end-of-life context. Not surprisingly, evi-
dence that is "loose, equivocal, or contradictory" falls short of 
the clear and convincing threshold.33 Prior statements about end-
of-life preferences that are "general, remote, spontaneous, and 
made in casual circumstances" are routinely held to be unreli-
able by courts applying the clear and convincing standard.34 
Courts in cases like Ms. Schiavo's have consistently held that fi-
delity to the clear and convincing evidence standard requires re-
liance only on prior statements that speak to the exact (or nearly 
exact) circumstances at hand. There have been many cases in 
[the fact finder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of 
the precise facts in issue.) 
(emphasis added). 
30. Matter of Westchester County Med. Ctr. On Behalf of O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 
607,613 (N.Y. 1988) (emphasis added). 
31. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399,411 (Mich. 1995) (emphasis added). 
32 /d. 
33. Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 148 A.D.2d 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1989). 
34. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 443. 
396 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:383 
which a court has declined to authorize termination of life-
sustaining measures because the now-incapacitated patient's 
prior remarks about end-of-life preferences spoke to circum-
stances distinct from those presented. For example, in Wendland 
v. Wendland, an individual (Mr. Wendland) who became se-
verely cognitively impaired in an automobile accident had previ-
ously been heard to say (to numerous witnesses) that he would 
never want to live "like a vegetable." However, the court held 
that this did not constitute clear and convincing evidence suffi-
cient to discontinue life-sustaining measures, given that his pre-
sent condition was technically not vegetative, but rather "mini-
mally conscious."35 Similarly, in In re Martin, the court held that 
a patient's prior statements that he did not wish to have his life 
preserved artificially by a machine or if he were ever in a vegeta-
tive state, were not clear and convincing evidence supporting a 
decision to discontinue life-sustaining measures in the circum-
stances presented because Mr. Martin was neither in a vegetative 
state, nor relying on a machine to sustain his life artificially.36 He, 
like Mr. Wendland, was in a minimally conscious, yet incompe-
tent state. 
Courts have not only described the types of prior statements 
that fall short of the clear and convincing evidence standard; 
many courts have gone so far as to enumerate specific comments 
that should be deemed presumptively unreliable by triers of fact 
seeking to discern an incapacitated patient's preferences regard-
ing life-sustaining measures.37 For example, there seems to be 
wide agreement among courts considering the question that 
prior "statements made in response to seeing or hearing about 
another's prolonged death do not fulfill the clear and convincing 
standard" of evidence required to show that the incapacitated 
patient would have wanted medical treatment withheld.38 Simi-
larly, courts have expressed serious doubts about the reliability 
of an "off-hand remark about not wanting to live under certain 
circumstances made by a person when young and in the peak of 
35. Conservatorship of Wendland, 26 Cal. 4th 519,519 (2001). 
36. Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 399. 
37. Wendland, 26 Cal. 4th at 519 
38. Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 416; see also Jobes, 531 N.E.2d at 412 (declaring that "in-
formally expressed reactions to other people's medical condition and treatment" are not 
clear and convincing evidence of one's own intentions regarding life-sustaining meas-
ures); Matter of Westchester County on behalf of O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d fJJ7, 532 (N.Y. 
1988) (deeming as unreliable "immediate reactions to the unsettling experience of seeing 
or hearing of another's unnecessarily prolonged death"); Elbaum, 148 A.D.2d at 253 
(same). 
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health. "39 Courts have likewise observed that a prior statement 
that a person would not "want to be a burden" should not be re-
garded as clear and convincing evidence of a desire to decline 
life-sustaining measures.40 In a similar vein, courts have ex-
pressed the view that general statements made in the past that 
one would not want "to be sustained on anything artificial" or on 
"life supporting machinery," do not constitute clear and convinc-
ing evidence necessary to discontinue life-sustaining measures.41 
As discussed above, the central purpose of the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard is to ensure reliability in determining 
the now-incapacitated patient's intentions. One court cautioned 
that reliance on statements like the foregoing could potentially 
yield disastrous results: 
If such statements were routinely held to be clear and con-
vincing proof of a general intent to decline all medical treat-
ment once incompetency sets in, few nursing home patients 
would ever receive life-sustaining medical treatment in the fu-
ture. The aged and infirm would be placed at grave risk if the 
law uniformly but unrealistically treated the expression of 
such sentiments as a calm and deliberate resolve to decline all 
life-sustaining medical assistance once the speaker is silenced 
by mental disability.42 
What, then, persuaded the reviewing courts that Ms. 
Schiavo's desire was to decline life-sustaining measures under 
the circumstances? What quantum of proof was marshaled to 
demonstrate this proposition to the satisfaction of the most ex-
acting evidentiary standard available in civil cases? A careful re-
view of the record reveals a jarring truth: The evidence deemed 
"clear and convincing" in the Schiavo case was a veritable pa-
rade of every species of presumptively unreliable statement long 
rejected by courts across the nation called upon to adjudicate 
end-of-life disputes. 
At the January 2000 trial, the court heard from five wit-
nesses who recounted past comments by Ms. Schiavo ostensibly 
relating to her end-of-life preferences. Two witnesses, Mary 
Schindler (Ms. Schiavo's mother) and Diane Meyer (Ms. 
Schiavo's childhood friend) testified that, based on conversations 
with Ms. Schiavo about the widely publicized Quinlan case (in-
39. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 443 (quoting In the Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 
(N.J. 1985)). 
40. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 6(J7, 
41. See id.; see also Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1209. 
42 O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 614. 
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volving a dispute about termination of life-sustaining measures), 
they believed that Ms. Schiavo would not, under the circum-
stances, elect to decline artificial nutrition and hydration.43 An 
additional witness, Jackie Rhodes, testified that in the many 
times she and Ms. Schiavo had visited her grandmother in a 
nursing home, Ms. Schiavo never expressed to her that she 
would wish to decline artificial nutrition and hydration were she 
ever to fall into a profoundly dependent condition. Three wit-
nesses: Michael Schiavo, Scott Schiavo (Mr. Schiavo's brother), 
and Joan Schiavo (Mr. Schiavo's sister-in-law) testified that Ms. 
Schiavo had, at various times, expressed her desire to decline 
life-sustaining measures under certain circumstances. 
In making its decision, the court discounted the testimony of 
Rhodes, Schindler, and Meyer. Judge Greer deemed the 
Schindler testimony to be unreliable based on his understanding 
that Ms. Schiavo's comments were made in 1976 (the year in 
which Judge Greer thought Ms. Quinlan had died), when Ms. 
Schiavo was only eleven or twelve years of age.44 In fact, Judge 
Greer's understanding of the Quinlan chronology was mis-
taken-Karen Ann Quinlan died in 1985, which would suggest 
that Ms. Schiavo's remarks could have been made when she was 
between the ages of seventeen and twenty (as Ms. Schindler had 
originally asserted at the hearing). Similarly, Judge Greer dis-
counted the Meyer testimony based on the same error; he re-
garded Meyer's testimony as uncredible because Meyer implied 
that Karen Quinlan was still alive in 1982.45 Judge Greer was 
"mystified" by Meyer's testimony and concluded that the con-
versation must have taken place in the 1970s, when Ms. Schiavo 
was a child.46 But this, of course, was not necessarily so. Thus, 
Judge Greer discounted evidence that Ms. Schiavo would not 
choose to decline artificial nutrition and hydration, based in sig-
nificant part, on an easily verifiable factual error about a histori-
cal event. 
Far more troubling than what the Florida court discounted 
as credible, was what it took to be "clear and convincing." Judge 
Greer's conclusion that Ms. Schiavo would want under the cir-
cumstances, to decline artificial nutrition and hydration, relied 
43. Transcript of Record at 372-73, 762, In re Guardianship of Schiavo No. 90-
2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. January 2000) [hereinafter Jan. 2000 Hr'g] (direct examina-
tions of Mary Schindler and Diane Meyer, respectively). 
44. Feb. 2000 Order, supra note 27, at 9. 
45. I d. at 5. 
46. Id. 
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entirely on four statements she allegedly made regarding her 
own treatment in the event that she should become profoundly 
disabled. First, the court relied on Mr. Schiavo's testimony that 
many years prior on a train ride, Ms. Schiavo stated that if she 
"ever had to be a burden to anybody like [her uncle was to her 
grandmother], [she didn't] want to live like that."47 Ms. Schiavo's 
uncle had been in a car accident, and was disabled: His right arm 
was paralyzed; he walked with a severe limp; and had slurred 
speech.48 Ms. Schiavo's elderly and ailing grandmother was the 
sole caretaker for the uncle. Second, Mr. Schiavo testified that 
he and Ms. Schiavo watched documentaries involving disabled 
individuals who were profoundly dependant upon others. In re-
sponse to the suffering of these patients, Ms. Schiavo purport-
edly asked Mr. Schiavo not to "keep her alive on anything artifi-
cial. ,49 
The third statement relied upon by the court was the testi-
mony of Scott Schiavo that in 1986, at the funeral following the 
death of his grandmother, Ms. Schiavo made remarks indicating 
what her views were regarding life-sustaining measures.50 Scott 
Schiavo's grandmother had been maintained at the end of her 
life solely by a host of life-sustaining machinery against her 
clearly stated wishes. According to Scott Schiavo's testimony, 
the interventions sustaining his grandmother included "some-
thing that is breathing for you ... [and devices that] pump[] 
blood Jinto your heart] and oxygen to your brain and everything 
else."5 He described the machinery as "lifting [her] off the bed 
for air ... [and causing] her chest [to] pump[] up."52 At the fu-
neral for his grandmother, all of the grandchildren were express-
ing their anger that the grandmother had been "ke~t alive on a 
machine" against her wishes, "after she was gone." 3 According 
to Scott Schiavo, Ms. Schiavo added her thoughts in response to 
the suffering of the Schiavo grandmother and stated, "if I ever 
go like that, just let me go. Don't leave me there. I don't want to 
be kept alive on a machine."54 This comment-made at there-
ception following the Schiavo grandmother's funeral-was the 
47. Jan. 2000 Hr'g, supra note 43, at 30-31. (direct examination of Michael 
Schiavo). 
48. See id. at 32. 
49. ld. at 33. 
50. See Feb. 2000 Order, supra note 27, at 9. 
51. Jan. 2000 Hr'g, supra note 43, at 100 (direct examination of Scott Schiavo). 
52 Id. at 110. 
53. ld. at 102. 
54. Id. 
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only remark Scott Schiavo ever recalled Ms. Schiavo making 
about life-sustaining measures.55 Curiously, Scott Schiavo failed 
to mention this one instance to anyone until nine years after Ms. 
Schiavo became severely cognitively disabled and profoundly 
dependant. 
The final comment relied upon by Judge Greer to support 
his conclusion regarding Ms. Schiavo's wishes was reported by 
Joan Schiavo, Mr. Schiavo's sister-in-law (the wife of his brother, 
Scott Schiavo).56 Joan Schiavo testified that: 
We had watched a movie one time on television. It was about 
somebody. I don't remember. It was about a guy who had an 
accident and he was in a comma [sic]. There was no help for 
him. We had stated that if that ever happened to one of us, in 
our lifetime, we would not want to go through that. That we 
would want it stated in our will we would want the tubes and 
everything taken out.57 
Joan Schiavo further testified that she thought that the 
character in the movie was sustained on a "breathing machine" 
or a "feeding machine."58 Joan Schiavo added, however, "I don't 
remember the movie. I really don't remember the movie."59 
Nevertheless, she seemed to recall that the character's condition 
was terminal, and that he died within "months to a year,"60 
though she added again that she wasn't sure about this aspect of 
the movie either.61 Joan Schiavo, like her husband, failed to men-
tion this conversation until nine years following Ms. Schiavo's 
collapse and disability. 
These four statements were the sum and substance of the 
evidence upon which Judge Greer based his conclusion that Ms. 
Schiavo would want to terminate artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion under the circumstances presented. That such evidence 
would be regarded as "clear and convincing" is nothing short of 
astonishing. To the contrary, all of the foregoing comments are 
paradigmatic examples of statements that courts routinely deem 
to be presumptively unreliable. First, all of the four statements 
were "general, remote, and made in casual circumstances." All 
of the statements were made at least five years prior to Ms. 
55. See id. at 105. 
56. See Feb. 2000 Order, supra note 27, at 9. 
57. Jan. 2000 Hr'g, supra note 43, at 233 (direct examination of Joan Schiavo). 
58. Id. at 234. 
59. Id. at 239 (cross examination of Joan Schiavo). 
60. I d. at 240. 
61. Id. 
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Schiavo's collapse. Two of the four statements were made while 
watching television or movies; one was made during a casual 
conversation on a train; one was made during an informal (and 
highly emotionally charged) conversation at a reception follow-
ing a funeral. Each statement could also fairly be characterized 
as an "off-hand remark about not wanting to live under certain 
circumstances made by a person when young and in the peak of 
health." 
Most damningly, all of the statements attributed to Ms. 
Schiavo were "made in response to seeing or hearing about an-
other's prolonged death," a category of comment that courts 
regularly dismiss as unreliable. Compounding this error, all of 
the statements were made in response to circumstances factually 
dissimilar to Ms. Schiavo's. Ms. Schiavo's condition was non-
terminal. She was not in a coma. Most experts have described 
her condition as a "persistent vegetative state," characterized by 
"the absence of cognitive behavior of any kind, and an inability 
to communicate or interact purposefully with the environ-
ment."62 She was not maintained on a ventilator or other "ma-
chine." She did, however, receive artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion by means of a PEG tube. By contrast, Ms. Schiavo's uncle's 
condition was nothing like hers-he suffered from paralysis in 
one arm, difficulty walking, and slurred speech. Likewise, Ms. 
Schiavo's condition did not resemble those of the terminally ill 
comatose character from the movie she and Joan Schiavo pur-
portedly viewed together (to the extent that Joan Schiavo was 
able to recall the details of this film). Nor was Ms. Schiavo's 
condition like that of the Schiavo grandmother, who was termi-
nally ill and required all manners of invasive machinery to sus-
tain her life. Finally, it is not clear at all that Ms. Schiavo's condi-
tion matched those of the individuals in the documentaries that 
Mr. Schiavo claimed that they watched together. If Judge Greer 
had followed the well-developed body of persuasive authority 
for interpreting such evidence, he would have been compelled to 
conclude that these statements were not sufficient to support a 
decision to terminate life-sustaining measures for Ms. Schiavo. 
In another departure from the well-established jurispru-
dence in this area, Judge Greer chose to rely on statements that 
were near verbatim examples of comments that courts uniformly 
62. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Am. Acad. of Neurology, Medical As-
pects of the Persistent Vegetative State-First of Two Parts, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED 1499, 
1499 (1994). Ms. Schiavo's parents and their supporters strenuously objected to Ms. 
Schiavo's diagnosis in this regard. 
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deem presumptively unreliable. Specifically, Judge Greer 
pointed to Ms. Schiavo's remarks that she "would not want to be 
a burden," and that she would not want to be sustained "on any-
thing artificial" or "on a machine" as a basis for his decision to 
withdraw her PEG tube. 
Finally, in crediting the testimony of Michael Schiavo, Judge 
Greer relied on evidence that was patently "equivocal and con-
tradictory." Mr. Schiavo's testimony that his wife would want to 
cease life-sustaining measures, based on his recollection of prior 
conversations, squarely contradicted his own testimony given 
under oath in prior judicial proceedings. First, during the dam-
ages phase of a medical malpractice suit brought on his wife's 
behalf shortly after her collapse, Mr. Schiavo requested compen-
sato~ damages sufficient to care for her "for the rest of [his] 
life." Indeed, he testified that he was studying to become a 
nurse so that he could care for her for the rest of her life, which 
was not expected to be cut short by her disability.64 At this trial 
he made no mention of the fact that, based on her prior ex-
pressed wishes, he would shortly thereafter decide against sus-
taining her life by artificial means. But this is precisely the deci-
sion that Mr. Schiavo made-a fact that caused Guardian ad 
Litem Richard Pearse to view with deep skepticism the entirety 
of Mr. Schiavo's comments regarding his wife's wishes.65 
Moreover, Mr. Schiavo's account of his wife's wishes di-
rectly contradicted comments that he made in a November 1993 
deposition in which he discussed his decision not to treat his 
wife's urinary tract infection. Mr. Schiavo stated that it was his 
desire at that point to allow Ms. Schiavo to succumb to the infec-
tion because this is what she would have wanted under the cir-
cumstances.66 However, when asked why he refused to take the 
advice of a physician who suggested that Mr. Schiavo remove 
her feeding tube (because, according to the physician Ms. 
Schiavo had "died four years ago"), Mr. Schiavo responded "I 
couldn't do that to Terry [sic]."67 
Judge Greer's determination that the insufficient testimony 
described above was "clear and convincing" evidence was af-
firmed by the intermediate appellate court, though in doing so, 
63. Trial Transcript at 28, Barnett Bank Trust Co. v. Igel, No. 92-000939-15 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. 1992) (Michael Schiavo direct examination, Nov. 5, 1992). 
64. /d. at 26-1:7. 
65. Jan. 2000 Hr'g, supra note 43, at 698-99. 
66. Michael Schiavo Dep. 15, Nov. 19, 1993. 
67. /d. at 33-34. 
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the court observed that the statements attributed to Ms. Schiavo 
were "few and ... oral."68 Immediately thereafter, the Schindlers 
came forward with testimony from several witnesses, including 
an affidavit from a former girlfriend of Mr. Schiavo (Trudy Ca-
pone), in which she stated, under oath, that Mr. Schiavo admit-
ted to her on numerous occasions that he had no idea what Ms. 
Schiavo would choose under her present circumstances.69 The 
trial court barred this testimony as untimely. The intermediate 
appellate court affirmed this judgment but noted that on re-
mand, the Schindlers would be permitted to file a revised motion 
for relief under a separate rule of procedure if they could "plead 
and prove newly discovered evidence of such a substantial na-
ture that it proves" that Ms. Schiavo would not wish to terminate 
artificial nutrition and hydration under the present circum-
stances.70 On remand, Judge Greer concluded that this evidence 
failed to present a "colorable claim for entitlement to relief from 
the judgment." This conclusion was affirmed on appeal.71 
The only questions that the Florida courts were willing to 
entertain for the balance of the litigation (from 2001 until 2005) 
had little or no relevance to discerning Ms. Schiavo's actual 
wishes. There followed a protracted dispute about the nature of 
Ms. Schiavo's condition, namely, whether it could fairly be char-
acterized as a persistent vegetative state and whether she might 
benefit from experimental therapies. As suggested above, these 
inquiries are more appropriate to those approaches to end-of-life 
decision-making that turn on what a reasonable person would 
want under the circumstances, what constitutes the "best inter-
ests" of the patient, or what actions the patient's current quality 
of life would require. Whatever the virtues of these approaches 
might be, their aim is manifestly not to vindicate the autonomy 
of the patient by discerning and implementing her actual wishes, 
as reflected by her prior statements. 
CONCLUSION 
The Schiavo case has been discussed at length by the legal, 
political and cultural commentariat. The bulk of such discussion, 
however, has been based on false factual premises. A careful re-
68. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176,180 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001). 
69. Trudy Capone Aff. 1, May 9, 2001 ("[Michael Schiavo] said to me many times 
that he had no idea what [Ms. Schiavo's] wishes were.") (on file with author). 
70. Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551,554 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001). 
71. Schindler v. Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640,643 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001). 
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view of the record reveals that the Schiavo matter should not be 
regarded as a victory for spouses over parents or the individual 
over the government in making decisions about life-sustaining 
measures. Most importantly, however, a clear understanding of 
the Schiavo case compels the conclusion that it does not, con-
trary to popular understanding, represent a victory for the right 
of autonomy and self-determination in this context. In fact, the 
opposite is true. While the law governing that case was generally 
(though imperfectly) calibrated to vindicate these values, the 
sloppy and seemingly indifferent manner in which the Florida 
courts approached the crucial (and decisive) question of Ms. 
Schiavo's wishes prevented the realization of this goal. The Flor-
ida courts abandoned the single most important mechanism the 
law provided for ensuring that Ms. Schiavo's wishes would be re-
liably discerned and implemented- the clear and convincing 
evidence standard of proof. As a result, it is not possible to have 
any confidence that Ms. Schiavo's actual intentions were hon-
ored. Not only did the Florida courts persistently refuse to rigor-
ously pursue the question of Ms. Schiavo's actual wishes, they 
employed the bulk of their resources to conduct inquiry into 
questions relating to Ms. Schiavo's present and future quality of 
life. This approach is inconsistent with the ideals of autonomy 
and self-governance at the end of life. Far from being a victory 
for freedom, the Schiavo matter represents an abject failure of 
the law to provide the framework within which autonomy might 
truly be exercised. 
